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Abstract  
Many challenges exist regarding the discourse over human rights in South East Asia due to the 
complex relationship between the region’s myriad cultures, laws, religions and political desires. 
This socio-political environment produces a number of varying, and often contradictory, 
interpretations of human rights, as well as differing opinions on how they should be implemented. 
On one hand, some countries in Southeast Asia have internalized international human rights 
instruments by amending their constitutions in order to provide a semblance of protection for 
their citizen’s human rights. On the other hand, some countries still operate under authoritarian 
regimes and continue to violate certain internationally recognized rights for the sake of preserving 
political stability and economic development. Proponents of such regimes often claim that this is 
done to maintain both societal and religious harmony. Therefore, the effort to address human 
rights issues in Southeast Asia must expand beyond the international legal sphere and take into 
account the intricate relationships and power struggles between the region’s various economic 
interests, social and cultural norms, and religions. Furthermore, the successful implementation of 
human rights law in Southeast Asia will require a number of obligations and checks be imposed 
on the state governments in the region. The specific means by which to promote human rights in 
South East Asia, and how to reconcile diverging options on the definition and scope of said rights, 
was the theme of the 2
nd
 Annual Conference of the Centre for Human Rights, Multiculturalism 
and Migration (CHRM2) and Indonesian Consortium for Human Rights Lecturers (SEPAHAM 
Indonesia), held in August, 2017, at the University of Jember. This article is a summary of the 
major points and topics covered during the two day conference.  
Keywords: Human Rights, Southeast Asia, Plurality of Pluralities 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this preliminary write-up is to provide a sketch of my own impressions of 
this important conference, organised so well by the Centre for Human Rights, 
Multiculturalism and Migration (CHRM2) University of Jember led by Dr. Al Khanif and 
his excellent team of helpers and the various organisations that supported this project. 
Huge thanks are due for the privilege for being part of such an important and in many 
ways pioneering effort, as I think we realise that, so much work remains to be done, at 
various levels, and in years to come. I would like to point to the valuable research tool of 
a major worldwide OUP encyclopedia of legal history,
1
 which has many important 
contributions, including entries on Indonesia. For those who wish to read up on my 
theorising about legal pluralism in different contexts, I have added at the end of this 
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  Stanley N Katz, The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History (Oxford University Press, 
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article references to my works.
2
 In what follows, I shall often make reference to the kite 
model of law, which I spoke about in the final presentations, the second part of which was 
distributed to all conference participants. To clarify upfront, the four competing elements 
of law, according to this model, basically are:  
 
Corner 1: ethics/morality/values/religion  
Corner 2: socio-cultural norms, customs and traditions, plus economic concerns 
Corner 3: various aspects of state law and institutions 
Corner 4: human rights principles (‘new natural law’) and international law 
 
I hope to have made it clear that this kite can apply to and be used by individuals as legal 
actors/agents in four different capacities, as more or less autonomous individuals, as 
members of societies or social groups, as citizens of a state, and as global citizens. These 
corners also represent four different kinds of law, and their connections to different 
academic disciplines. Whatever the scenario, there is no escape from the existing 
worldwide pluri-legality and the resultant competing claims, with their pushes and pulls, of 
different law-related expectations or other significant events or moments, like for example 
9/11 or, in Indonesia, the fall of Suharto in May 1998. 
This means that even an element of law that one hates, or does not wish to engage 
with, has to be included, as not to do so would be epistemic violence, but also most likely 
actual injustice, and would thus lead to more conflicts and risks for the crashing of the 
kite. Law, we know, is never just state law, or just human rights law, or just religious law, 
or adat, for that matter. The challenge is always to find a sustainable balance of the 
competing elements, which may however result only in a temporary moment of bliss, 
rather than a long-lasting state of serene peace, as the clock of time and changed 
circumstances constantly ticks on.  
The changing circumstances to which we are all subject are also evident in the 
political background of the most recent piece of writing on Indonesian conflicts that 




II. CONFERENCE SUMMARY: THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 
The start of the Conference, with the singing of the national anthem of Indonesia and the 
strong reference to God and Pancasila, placed this event into a firm national context 
(corner 3, but also immediately the values connected to corner 1), while the speech on 
human rights that followed emphasised the role of corner 4. From the start, I got the 
impression that corner 2, in this gathering of people who are mainly lawyers and human 
rights experts, might be a little underdeveloped and underestimated. But that said, I 
detected a subtle kite balance from the start in much of the constructive engagement, and 
in various efforts to sail forward peacefully for the greater public good and the wider 
public interest, rather than developing a focus on particularistic and unconstructively 
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  Menski, Werner F, “Bangladesh in 2015: Challenges of the ‘iccher ghuri’ for learning to live together”, 
(30 December 2015), online: Alochonaa Dialogue <https://alochonaa.com/2015/12/30/bangladesh-in-
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Kite: Managing Legal Pluralism in the Context of Islamic Finance” in Islam Finance Eur Plur Financ 
Syst (Chelthemham: Edrward Elgar Publishing, 2013) & Menski, Werner F, “Plural Worlds of Law and 
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  Kirsten E Schulze, “The ‘ethnic’ in Indonesia’s communal conflicts: violence in Ambon, Poso, and 
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negative complaints and protests. In my view, critical analysis is one thing, and it remains 
important, but unconstructive critique for the sake of being critical or being perceived to 
be politically correct is quite a different matter. It can be petty and destructive, killing the 
spirit of academic enterprise and enquiry by trying to win points over one’s opponents. 
Guided by many skilful chairpersons of panels, this conference took place in a spirit of 
constructive exchange and displayed a huge and quite remarkable willingness to learn 
from each other, with very few indications of self-righteous behaviour on the part of 
participants and questioners.  
This is quite different, as I should emphasise from the start, from attending such 
conferences in South Asia, where political turmoil of various kinds often mars debates, 
allows pompous monologues, and makes constructive exchange virtually impossible in 
many scenarios. It also differs from euro-centric debates, where certain forms of political 
correctness now demand that some important topics cannot even be openly raised. 
A lot of this notably constructive approach in an Indonesian context may have to do 
with the unspoken, but constant and vivid presence of the five principles of Pancasila in 
Indonesia, which to most people present would have been entirely familiar. To me this 
warrant being highlighted here for the benefit of us all expressly, to illustrate the wider 
holistic context within which this important conference took place and also to indicate the 
remaining potential for turbulences over disagreements on some of these principles: 
 
1. Belief in God 
This is clearly a reference to corner 1, and the major challenge here for Indonesia is to 
accept a plurality of forms of belief in some kind of higher entity or force. God, as we 
know from religious studies, can take many forms, or no visible form at all, but is also 
perceivable simply as a higher force that we humans ignore at our peril. As I indicated in 
the final presentation, a more wide-ranging reference to ‘being connected to some higher 
entity’ would be useful to be aware of as a more broadly uniting principle. The explicit 
reference to ‘God’, no doubt influenced by the majoritarian presence of Muslims in 
Indonesia and the colonial Christian heritage of the country’s legal system, risks, as we 
know, that certain forms of belief might struggle being recognised and accepted. The 
fundamental right to freedom of religion is, however, connected to this principle, both as 
a matter of law (corner 3) and of philosophy (corner 1). Hence a plurality-conscious, 
diversity-friendly approach to this Grundnorm would appear to me to remain essential for 
maintaining the national ‘unity in diversity’ that characterises Indonesia (see also principle 
3 below) under this heading so well. 
 
2. Just and Civilised Humanity including Tolerance to all People 
This refers not only to corner 4, but is first of all a statement of socio-cultural diversity, so 
concerns also corner 2. The challenge here is not only about freedom of belief and 
culturally informed practices of various kinds, whether traditional, customary/indigenous 
or more recent and received, but probably also about acknowledgement of socio-
economic differences and all the status implications that might or would go with it. This is 
therefore also an affirmation of the principle of common citizenship on the basis of 
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3. Unity of Indonesia 
This expects clearly a basic commitment to the political and national unity of the country, 
a huge challenge for a country and a nation state composed of so many different groups, 
regions and islands. The focus here is undoubtedly on corner 3, but it also contains a 
lesson for corner 4, to the effect that national unity and sovereignty come before 
commitment to globally constructed values and principles which may not be imposed on 
the country without due deliberations, debates and, if necessary, as some conference 
panels brought out well, certain reservations. This is because the task of defining a 
sustainable identity postulate of Indonesia, following the work of Masaji Chiba
4
 is a 
primary task for Indonesians as a collective civic body, not for the international 
community and their representatives or any other stakeholders. 
 
4. Democracy Led by the Wisdom of Deliberation among Representatives of the 
People 
This indicates today a strong commitment to the basic state principles of participatory 
democracy in a plural nation (corner 3), but is also aware of the massive and potentially 
dangerous scope for different opinions and perceptions, which should be subject to well-
considered debate and open exchange. So, this is also taking care of socio-cultural and 
socio-economic diversities (corner 2), different belief structures (corner 1) and also 
concerns human rights principles (corner 4). 
 
5. Social Justice for All 
While this looks at first sight like a commitment to equality in corner 2, it also touches on 
corners 4, 3 and 1 respectively. I see here an ambitious engagement to construct a 
sustainable future in which all citizens of Indonesia have a share in the nation, and an 
expectation that everyone involved needs to be aware of the balancing of rights and duties. 
The great basic point about these five principles seems to me, compared to what I 
know from the basic principles of state policy statements in Pakistan, Bangladesh and also 
India, the observation that these five principles or programmatic ideals of a national vision 
are actually broadly agreed pillars of the nation in Indonesia, especially in the post-
authoritarian era,
5
 would seem to doubt that, but I think knowing that this vision exists 
and deliberately not following it are two quite different things that both need to be 
analysed together. As a nation that is turning 72 on the day when I began to write this 
piece, Indonesia seems to have finally grown wiser and has shed earlier authoritarian 
models of law and governance to become a more convincingly true democratic republic. 
There are, it seems, still many concerns and objections, but no major subversive forces 
that would seek to kick any one of these Pancasila principles out altogether. That said, 
though, recent developments in Aceh, in particular, provide some insights into what may 
happen if one ignores the balance, and what the risks and harms are, if one goes down 
that route.  
This is of course very different in the highly bi-partisan politics of implementing the 
national vision of Bangladesh in particular, but also in Pakistan and in India and Sri 
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Lanka. As was expressed at some point during the Conference, the presence of an 
explicitly Islamic party or parties in Indonesia that would then seek to exclude others 
would constitute a considerable risk factor for this entire Muslim-dominated nation. This 
would be so especially if the definition of Islam and what it means to be Islamic is not 
broadly enough conceived, but is dogmatically and narrowly focused on specific textual 
interpretations, overlooking the human-made interpretations of what tend to be very 
broad and wide-ranging moral/ethical statements in the Qur’an, in the first place. It 
should thus be beneficial in future years for scholars of Islam in Indonesia to engage in 
comparative work to check what comes out of other jurisdictions in which, for example, 
Islamic criminal law is sought to be introduced as a man-made construct, which may end 
up being of rather questionable Islamic standing, if one dares to analyse such problems 
more deeply. Warning examples are plentiful from Pakistan, in particular. For those who 
read German, Naarmann offers a brilliant study of blasphemy laws, a comparison of the 
legal position in Germany, England, India and Pakistan.
6




 In this context, I indicated at the end of the conference that the new massive study 
by Shahab Ahmed “What is Islam? The importance of being Islamic,
8
 though it does not 
explicitly cover Indonesia, and Ahmed speaks of the range ‘from the Balkans to Bengal’, 
is going to be highly pertinent also for Indonesian discourses. By opening up the 
epistemological range in such a way as to include Pre-Text, Text, and Context for the 
deliberation of anything to do with Islam and being Islamic, this study contains important 
lessons for many years to come, for all of us. It was good to see that in panel session 4.2, 
Dr. Ahmad Syamsu Madyan actually identified such hermeneutical gaps, which are of 
crucial importance for Indonesian discourses today and in the future. Notably, such 





III. DAY 1 OF THE CONFERENCE 
The Conference itself, on day 1, kicked off with a keynote lecture by Professor Carol Tan 
of SOAS, asking to what extent CEDAW could help women from Indonesia who venture 
to work abroad and may suffer significant harm, abuses and much precocity. While this 
raised questions about the interaction of corners 4 and 3 of the kite of law, in terms of 
who should be held responsible in case of trouble, I think it became clear through this 
presentation that international law, despite much persuasive effort and energy, has limited 
practical reach for the individual woman suffering abuse and harm. The conclusion, that 
adjustments to local conditions would be needed before any wide-ranging global 
conventions were relied on, reflects not only on the scenario of pluri-legality also in this 
field of studies relating to international worker migration. It should in future conferences 
be brought out much more that a nation state that somewhat encourages its people to go 
abroad for work, as the state will benefit from massive remittances, should then also be 
held more responsible for ensuring that its nationals, while working abroad, are suitably 
protected, maybe through bilateral agreements rather than wider global instruments. The 
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emphasis, then, is on corners 3 and 2, not on corner 4. That in this labour market 
scenario any too explicitly protective state intervention might drive away interest on the 
part of certain nations in recruiting Indonesians as migrant workers could be one 
significant consequence, which also deserves deeper analysis. If that scenario occurs, it is 
evident that there will be other people from other countries willing to take up such places.  
Another related issue is the fact that many stakeholders actually benefit from worker 
migration abroad, so this becomes also an issue for corner 2 of the kite, at all levels of 
interaction, right down to the concerned family and individual members. If individuals 
find themselves trapped in bad working conditions abroad, which are not necessarily 
linked to big corporate abuses of power, but petty misuses of authority at household level, 
for example when employers are violating the basic rights of their domestic staff, appeals 
to CEDAW seem far-fetched, but are perhaps not completely irrelevant as ‘soft law’ or 
moral admonishments. In such scenarios, Pancasila principles 2 and 5 may be invoked as 
basic postulational values to remind those in positions of privilege to be better human 
beings and to treat others with greater respect. 
Whether this would be directly effective and helps the troubled individual, I seriously 
doubt. Maybe this is also a matter of public education, then, basically to inform people, 
and especially women, about the potential risks of going abroad for work and exposing 
themselves to all kinds of harm. Far too many individuals seem to be driven by entirely 
unrealistic dreams of a better life and may then be trapped and in due course crying for 
help in vain, resorting to potentially self-harming methods of seeking relief or release. 
While I was travelling back to the UK, I read in the Straits Times of 15.8.2017, page B6, 
a report of a maid from Myanmar in Singapore. She had poured Dettol into the cereals 
for her constantly nagging female employer, in a desperate effort to get out of this bad 
employment and be sent home. The report ends by saying that this maid could have been 
sentenced for up to 10 years in jail and a fine. Her lawyer’s successful plea for leniency 
resulted in a reduced sentence of five months’ jail. The individual drama experienced 
here does not even touch the presence of CEDAW as a protective tool from corner 4. 
This is mainly a matter of corners 2 and 1, with the state on stand-by to turn CCTV 
evidence of the mixing of the drink into a criminal offence for this miserable individual. 
As Professor Tan rightly stressed, making individual rules, regulations or laws does 
not immediately provide redress. There is of course no law prohibiting nagging of 
employees, anyway. In this unfortunate but telling case of the Burmese maid, the plea for 
mitigation provides some relief, but many other migrant workers would probably not find 
such help and would suffer in silence. That this kind of report is even published is telling 
– what are the agenda and intended messages of such reporting? In light of this, whether 
the right route is to advise women in Southeast Asia against becoming migrant workers in 
the first place or not may be debated. Merely calling for more international law seems like 
a shot in the dark. Nothing, it seems, will protect any of us against abuses arising from 
multiple acts of the basic human nastiness that results from the prevalence of unreason in 
the world that Amartya Sen has identified as a major recurring source of injustice. 
Becoming a migrant means to carry additional risks.
10
 
This message was very clear also from the presentation by Dr. Jesper Kulvmann on 
the predicaments of Pakistani asylum seekers in Bangkok. His account of ‘urban 
refugees’, who live mostly in camps, from which they might seek to extricate themselves 
for various reasons, was quite depressing, but of course no news at all for someone who 
knows how Pakistani asylum seekers are treated in the UK. 
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In Bangkok, too, most asylum applications are in due course rejected, more so (90%) 
for the about 20% of Christian Pakistani asylum seekers than the 80% Ahmadis who 
made it to Thailand and have ultimately a reported success rate of 90%. But before one 
gets to that stage of some kind of security, daily life is marred by police raids, hostility of 
locals, denial of the right to work, bribes to be paid to and by employers, and serious 
mental health implications. The presentation showed that recourse to human rights law is 
severely limited at all levels, as the realities of life are first of all played out between 
corners 2 and 3. Worryingly, children pay the highest price of falling through all sorts of 
holes in the officially existing protective nets of international law, despite much concerted 
effort of child-centred policies. Here again, recourse to corner 4 arguments provides little 
relief to the affected individuals, so that even the most basic human rights are violated.  
But here again, questions also need to be asked why such people have turned up as 
asylum seekers or refugees in a particular place. Who else, in particular, has benefited or 
profited from their trajectories of journey, which probably involved some form of 
trafficking, even if it was a form of self-trafficking? This makes it a corner 2 issue, both in 
terms of the social factors that lead, motivate or force families to migrate, and those who 
offer them ‘help’ in getting asylum seekers into a specific foreign country. The 
beneficiaries may very well be sitting in Pakistan itself, even creating and stirring up 
trouble locally to motivate more people to leave, and then ‘offering’ them help in 
managing the journey – of course for a price. In other words, this is not only an issue for 
Thai law, or a problem of international refugee law. Again there are all kite corners 
involved here, and multiple jurisdictions. 
The Q&A on this Plenary brought out a number of further issues regarding the fast 
rising role of remittances and the fact that ASEAN as a regional body does not manage to 
exert enough influence to protect migrant workers or refugees. It will be pertinent to be 
aware that migration into the region also occurs from outside ASEAN. While human 
rights activists would tend to defend the role of CEDAW, it was also observed that the 
laws produced by the UN have lost international respect, as any progress made seems 
really slow. The rich evidence of abuses might suggest that there is a moving backwards of 
the protective mechanisms, but at the same time there are also various initiatives and 
programmes to provide support. There is a massive global refugee crisis, no doubt, but 
not all of this is total gloom and doom. Humans have always moved, and not all migrants 
are refugees or asylum seekers, though they may have to claim that they are to seek entry 
to a particular territory or supportive mechanism in the first place.  
It is evident that this whole complex field is going to grow in importance and 
relevance. It is also clear to me from evidence from South Asia, especially from 
Bangladesh, that organised movement of migrants all over South East Asia and into and 
out of the region involves very many stakeholders, who often do not have the best 
interests of the migrants at heart. This comes down to the local bazaar, where ‘friendly’ 
advice to seek migratory escape is really designed to entrap vulnerable people into parting 
with lots of money that they may not even have. In such a messy scenario, there could be 
some scope for strengthening bilateral agreements between nations which also involve 
specific protective mechanisms for the migrants involved. There may also be a need for 
local criminalisation of traffickers and their support networks.  
In my kite model of analysis, the focus in terms of migrants is then again more on the 
interactions between corners 3 and 2, and far less on corner 4 than human rights activists 
would like to believe. In other words, what we need are situation-specific, sort of “glocal 
legal methods” of searching for viable solutions and suitable models, not merely a global 
blueprint of idealised statements about rights that remains too vague and liquid to offer 
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sustainable remedies for disadvantaged migrants and especially those people who are at 
the most direct risk of just being completely victimised.  
I personally also think that a state that encourages its citizens to migrate for work 
abroad, and basically trades in its own people, especially if such a state obviously seeks to 
benefit from the remittances that they would generate, then has a clear-cut obligation to 
ensure that the citizens are protected at all stages of this migrant worker journey. This 
protection should be extended and discussed right until the eventual re-integration into 
the home society, perhaps by providing the right framework to cultivate and promote 
sustainable investment. Specifically, any profits to the family concerned should not be 
blown in conspicuous consumption, but are better properly invested to safeguard the 
long-term future of the people and the nation. In Indonesia, this could also be discussed 
in terms of Pancasila principle 5, which could then be looked at as a principle of socio-
economic empowerment for those who have ventured abroad and their families. Here 
again, this is a matter of protecting people’s human rights through appropriate state-based 
laws and modifications in people’s socio-cultural normative perceptions rather than 
devising more and more well-sounding international conventions.  
The panels on day 1 contained a rich range of topics focused around gender justice. 
Of course this meant I could only attend certain papers and thus have no complete 
overview of what was being discussed. 
The presenters in Chamber 1.2 discussed child marriage regulations in Indonesia and 
showed very well how the national law in Article 7 of Law No. 1 of 1974 lays down 
minimum ages of 19 years for men and 16 years for women, but dispensations to marry 
earlier may be given in certain cases. In other words, there is ample room for discretion 
here and for exceptions within corner 3 itself. As a result, the human rights argument 
from corner 4 continues to be that there is a risk of moving backwards if too many 
allowances are made and the law is not strictly enough enforced. Yes, but what about 
social and ethical concerns? In other words, what about corners 2 and 1 of the kite? 
What was not brought out clearly enough, I felt, is the somewhat suspect effort on the 
part of international law stakeholders to enforce a globally uniform norm for minimum 
ages of 18 years for both parties, clearly for the sake of establishing a uniform global 
framework. This was justified by reference to statistics that a quarter of girls in Indonesia 
are married before the age of 18. That neither tells us how many girls are married before 
the age of 16, and thus identifies the potential harm of very early marriages, nor does it 
productively contribute to the discourse over any permissible exceptions. The focus in 
such arguments is only on enforcing a global corner 4 perspective, the 18 year rule. This 
is clearly too simplistic, and will remain unproductive for tackling the actual problems and 
their consequences.  
Indonesian scholars need to perhaps be more aware that this discourse is also being 
used to paint Indonesia in a negative light internationally, when it does not appear that 
there is in fact a serious problem of massive numbers of very early marriages. We clearly 
need more sophisticated research on this, as we do in south Asia. Similarly, devious 
arguments are not by coincidence also strongly being advocated for South Asian 
jurisdictions, where in India and Bangladesh, for example, the respective minimum ages 
are 21 years for men and 18 years for women presently. Again, in view of such high 
official minimum ages, the reported numbers of ‘child marriages’ are bound to be 
enormous, for many young people would marry between 16 and 21, for all kinds of 
reasons. In such discussions, it is also not disclosed and factored in that in several 
European countries, by comparison, the legal minimum ages are actually much lower. In 
English law, one can marry, with parental permission, at age 16. Other European 
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countries allow this even earlier. The result is that it always looks like Europe has 
abandoned child marriages, while the problematic Asian jurisdictions lag seriously 
behind. This is, however, misused as devious demagogics, of precisely the kind identified 
by Maeso & Araújo
11
 in the quote presented on slide 5 of my second set of final 
comments to the conference (which was distributed as a printout to participants), 
depicting the ‘problematic non-European other’ and claiming that we are not racist in 
Europe anymore, we are just concerned now about the correct values!  
It is thus made to look as though Indonesia, too, has a big problem with child 
marriages and international law protection is moving backward, because it is not being 
implemented. I know too little about the Indonesian scenario to understand whether what 
I would call ‘infant marriage’ rather than ‘child marriage’ is a real problem. But I would 
guess that problems will arise where young people after relatively early puberty discover 
the attractions of sexual contact and wish to engage in relationship, thus risking negative 
impact on local norms of honour and the family’s status, also infringing of course Islamic 
principles relating to the avoidance of zina. In such a scenario, also in countries like the 
UK, parents may resort to agreeing to an earlier marriage, or in fact may force an early 
marriage (rather often, however, not to the individual the young person concerned 
actually wants to marry), thus raising serious human rights concerns that have been 
classified under ‘forced marriage’ rather than ‘child marriage’. 
I do not know whether this is actually an issue in Indonesia, but at any rate, my 
advice is that in future conferences and research generally, this important topic should be 
further debated, with more detailed ethnographic evidence of what is actually going on in 
society. This is not primarily, in my view, a matter of the interaction of corners 4 and 3, 
but again of a more informed interaction of corners 2 and 3, with a strong dose of values 
and ethics coming from corner 1 as well. This suggests that debates focused only or too 
much on human rights miss the actual local picture and any real problems, and are then 
also not able to help devise strategies to support young individuals who for one reason or 
another were getting married rather earlier than they might have wanted. Or, if there is a 
desire to marry early, what are the reasons for this, and what should/could the state do to 
ensure that this does not have negative consequences? Merely repeating stereotypes that 
early marriages result in certain specific problems, as was also done during these 
presentations, is too simple and lacks convincing evidence. Further, what are the 
implications of any policies regarding marriage age on demographic management of an 
already very large population? 
A related issue, which also was not debated in the panel session I attended, is the 
presumption that marriages are of necessity registered by the state to be legally valid. I am 
not convinced that locally, Indonesian state law is everywhere so effective at grassroots 
level that it has achieved clear-cut harmony between what the state law directs and what 
people actually do. I am saying this because many years ago, in 1999, when Mick Jagger 
tried to defend himself against a divorce petition from Jerry Hall (which famously ended 
in an out-of-court settlement in London), I was called upon to investigate for the English 
court what the Indonesian law says about marriages of different kinds. I could see as a 
result of this research that this law is not as simple and as nationally uniform as it is often 
portrayed by law-centric people. Mick Jagger and Jerry Hall were not members of the 
local Hindu community on the beach at which they celebrated their colourful ‘marriage’. 
Hence, as non-locals, their marriage law was the state-centric Indonesian law which 
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certainly demands formal registration, which was not done. Among Indonesian locals, 
however, if there is – as I suspect - considerable room for the de facto existence of 
unregistered marriages of Indonesian citizens in Indonesian law, are there any 
implications in relation to age limits? How much of this then remains below the official 
radar, and why? 
 Regarding the position of multiculturalism in Indonesia, or whether one should 
rather discuss this as a form of interculturalism, Joeni Kurniawan, following the advice of 
foreign advisers (not me, in this respect, to be clear), relied to some extent on the writings 
of Kymlicka.
12
 These are world-famous, but may not actually be the pertinent theoretical 
material to provide appropriate foundations for a sustained and fitting debate on this topic 
in regard to Indonesia, where different forms of ethnicity and ‘difference’ intersect, 
overlap and contradict each other. As a Muslim majority state, moreover, and despite a 
formal commitment to secularism (which can, as we know, mean so many things), the 
presumption that the English words of the Constitution of Indonesia can capture the true 
ambit of what is going on in the country is highly doubtful. A reading between the lines 
and beyond the formal text would appear to be necessary to produce a country-specific 
analysis also here. My advice is, thus, that future scholarship on Indonesian law needs to 
be assiduously conscious of and alert to culture and its many influences. I am saying 
nothing new here that Hooker and others have not said and written about before, of 
course! But we always still far too often tend to forget such important methodological 
advice when we discuss ‘law’. 
In this concern for socio-cultural normativities and their related ethics not only the 
‘margin of appreciation’ as a constitutional law term of art for modern lawyers, but also 
the Islamic notion of plurilegality, as encompassed in the term ikhtilaf, would need to be 
interrogated. Both concern forms of discretion in interpretation, albeit in very different 
contexts. Their relevance for any debates on Indonesian law and the protection of gender 
justice and other forms of basic justice cannot be conducted only in or along the lines of 
human rights terminology, but has to be also perceived as a localised entity to make sense 
to the people of Indonesia. It is they, as citizens and ultimately as voters in democratic 
elections, who have to balance the various competing expectations. They need to learn to 
look through various tempting forms of demagogic representations that might sound and 
be convincing at first, but may turn out to be unsuitable, and even positively dangerous, 
for a deeply plural poly-ethnic and highly syncretic nation state that wishes to remain 
united, and prosperously sustainable, under the Pancasila umbrella. Here, too, a 
discourse focused on human rights might result in complaints and misgivings about lack 
of achievements in the direction of certain global benchmarks. But the challenge to devise 
a glocal system that fits the people of this huge nation state will simply not go away, and a 
more intensely plurality-conscious analysis is required. 
Day 1, I may just add here, ended with a delicious dinner and a presentation of 
Indonesian art forms that clearly showed and confirmed for all to see the hybridity of the 
living law of Indonesia, here in the field of performing arts. 
 
IV. DAY 2 OF THE CONFERENCE 
The plenary session at the start of the day was composed of two very different 
presentations, connected to human rights issues. Dr. Shahrul Mizan Ismail from Malaysia 
eloquently proposed an inverted triangular approach to rights protection. I guess this was 
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trying to make a contribution to global theorising about law and its effectiveness in terms 
of rights protection. However, this seemed to me too narrowly focused on corner 4 of the 
kite and largely left out the state perspective (corner 3) both in terms of public interest, 
public policy, and also the responsibility of the state to multiple stakeholders and interest 
groups, not only human rights activists or proponents. There was thus also, for my taste, 
too little concern for the fact that the issues debated are also matters of a socio-cultural 
and socio-political nature. In the discussion, it was raised that awareness of multiple forms 
of discretion is important, but quite how this is to be instrumentalised was not brought out 
in sufficient clarity. 
 The presentation on land rights in Timor Leste by Dr. Alex Grainger scrutinised 
the crucial issue of the extent to which a newly created modern nation state can claim 
reliance on the principle of eminent domain, in a socio-cultural and socio-political context 
where various communities have long-standing and often competing claims to multiple 
forms of land use and ownership. The presentation showed that these cannot, especially 
in today’s democratic contexts, just be ignored by reliance on the more or less naked 
power of the state, and not at all by appeals to ‘rule of law’. But simplistic human rights 
claims or discourses about indigenous people’s rights also run the risk of missing out the 
complexities indicated by the kite methodology of accounting for multiple competing 
stakeholders at one and the same time. 
How such competing claims are to be managed will engage researchers for many years 
to come, and this is an issue all over the world. The huge question to what extent a 
modern nation state that claims such rights of ownership then has an obligation, first and 
foremost, to guarantee and help provide (if not directly serve on a silver platter) rights to 
livelihood has quite evidently also arisen in this fairly small nation of about a million 
people. So we can anticipate that in future research and conferences, related topics will 
feature strongly, too, in relation to this young nation. Here again, the prominent 
international protection regime for minorities and indigenous people can be only one 
element in a highly complex arena of debates about the right balances between rights and 
duties. It was also made clear that as long as there was ample land for everyone, this was 
perhaps less of an issue than now, where perceptions of competition and scarcity, for all 
kinds of reasons, have become more prominent.
13
   
Focus on human rights discourse alone, to the neglect of other perspectives 
underplays also here the pragmatic importance of socio-economic concerns and claims, 
which is just as much a matter for individuals and communities as it is for the state and for 
any potential foreign or outside stakeholders like multinational companies, which were 
notably not (yet) involved in this scenario. These struggles over distribution are also 
matters that affect relations between citizens and the state and between different groups of 
citizens. The speaker did indicate at least the potentially spiritual role of land as well, 
manifestly a factor that cannot just be ignored in today’s modern world where ‘religion’ in 
al sorts of forms has crept back onto the agenda, or is simply making its presence more 
clearly felt and heard than earlier. In this we are right in the middle of the most recent 
and most sophisticated writing about the nature of the legal order in our post-modern 
world,
14
 where state-centricity remains a hugely important factor, but is not the only 
guardian, nor the only yardstick, of sustainable justice. 
The Panel Sessions throughout the morning offered a rich menu of papers about 
agrarian and environmental issues, rights to education and development and indigenous 
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rights in Southeast Asia. The paper presentations I attended were fascinating. Elizabeth 
Rhoads, talking about Burma/Myanmar showed the connections of urban property 
regimes and citizenship laws in an exciting glimpse of an ongoing study that will be a 
major contribution to knowledge in due course, it seems. 
Gerry Pindonta Ginting focused in his presentation on human rights and the theory of 
sovereignty, in relation to an apparently well-known Indonesian case of forced eviction of 
a local community, the Bukit Duri case in South Jakarta. Rather than theorising this 
through Agamben and highlighting the rather evident device of discretion in the law on 
the part of those who have or claim power, more focus on comparative research into 
these kinds of scenarios over basic land rights would have been useful, it seemed to me. 
What I find missing here is not just the insistence on recognition of certain formal or 
informal rights to property that some people may present as arguments, but a much more 
basic problem, namely that we jump to fashionable theorising too fast without telling the 
audience/reader what is actually going on in lived reality and how competing claims may 
be balanced out.  
Notably, this was also raised earlier by the presentation of Alex Grainger, namely that 
when a state claims control of regulating property rights, what is that state then going to do 
with people who cannot provide any proof that they own the place on which they put their 
head to rest at night? This very serious predicament, which arises today all over the world, 
and which in Western cities is called ‘homelessness’ when people are found sleeping on 
the pavement or in the entrances to the poshest shops in London, has much more 
widespread and massive implications in Asia and Africa where millions of uprooted local 
people now converge on cities, and then of necessity need to claim public space for their 
private use, as they could not possibly acquire new property rights in their situations of 
precarity. What, then, are the basic rights of such people, and what kind of legal order 
can protect their most basic needs and human rights, simply the right to occupy a space 
that is not their own as a member of the citizenry of that state? The Olga Tellis case of 
pavement dwellers in Mumbai in 1985, reported at AIR 1986 SC 180, raised such 
fundamental issues early on and simply concluded that such people had not absolute right 
to that particular spot of land they were occupying, so would need to move on, if so 
required, but only after due notice, and not in the form of brutal slum clearance or other 
removal methods. Bangladesh has had some important cases on this same subject, with 
similar outcomes, and the public interest dimension is clearly in evidence everywhere. 
We have, however, not even begun to address the burning key issue of what rights to 
concede to the landless masses from a more plurality-conscious multi-dimensional angle if 
we only focus only on human rights. It is unsurprising that states are not keen to discuss 
this or have this raised, but if states everywhere are so keen to grab and claim property 
rights, have they no corresponding obligations to protect those individuals and social 
groups whom they divested of the basic right to occupy a minimal space to be able to live? 
I observed a similar lack of activist acumen and plurality consciousness when it 
comes to legal analysis in the papers in Panel 3 that morning on eradication of illiteracy. 
Here, however, the risk is that as academics we overemphasise the duties of the state and 
fail to see that the individuals and their respective social groups have huge responsibilities 
for their own development. For, when it comes to learning, there also has to be a will to 
learn, a desire from within the individual to develop and be empowered, and we should 
not forget that in simplistic appeals for more state intervention in education. Such appeals 
to corner 3 of the kite may be completely justified, but without active involvement of 
corners 2 and also 1 this development process will not take sustainable shapes.  
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That the risk of falling back into illiteracy when the skills acquired at basic school are 
not solid enough and are not practised is still a reality for far too many people, but not 
only in countries like Indonesia. In that sense also in the global north, complete literacy is 
a myth. It is indeed tempting to think and talk of moving backwards in relation to places 
like Indonesia. But many more questions need to be asked about why the education that 
is being offered, or the way in which it is being offered, may not be suited for the needs of 
people, and especially of children. Is this not sometimes a matter also of language, given 
the many languages that Indonesia has? Or is it just the culture of the school environment 
and all sorts of deficiencies in the delivery of education? Simply claiming that the 
government is lazy, as was so passionately done in this panel, may sound good and 
appropriately ‘critical’, but is just not constructive and sophisticated enough, it seemed to 
me. The same argument goes for child-friendly villages, where again the extent of state 
involvement and state support is something that Indonesian scholars will need to discuss 
in more depth. This is not like Singapore, or Switzerland, of course, the conditions in 
Indonesia are very different, and effective protection mechanisms and processes require 
multi-level engagement and constant awareness, thus, of plurilegality. 
Education everywhere is a multi-agency process, so we would also here need to 
consider the input of the individuals and their mental framework or values (corner 1) and 
the socio-economic concerns of parents and children (corner 2) in law-related debates 
about education and child protection. The intensive interaction of human rights 
principles, state policies and laws, but also family and community strategies as well as 
individual engagement and participation, all need to be considered together, to break 
what many Asian scholars now seem to call the ‘vicious circle’ or ‘vicious cycle’ of 
disadvantage in primary education, in particular. Here again, scholars and activists in 
Indonesia can learn a lot from other Asian (and African) countries that face similar 
problems, and they should not presume that ‘Western’ systems have sorted out all 
problems, far from it. 
Intriguingly, this session also touched on the implications of digitalisation and the 
risks that even more people who are insufficiently schooled or educated will be left 
further behind in this new process of interacting with the world. Yes, indeed, in the age of 
the mobile phone and all sorts of apps, it is not only a matter of human rights, but also of 
common sense and socio-cultural and socio-economic prudence to ensure that as many 
people as possible have basic levels of literacy and numeracy so they can competently 
operate such gadgets. But let us have no illusions. That this challenge is never going to go 
away is already evident from new research in Western countries, where despite claims of 
100% literacy, this is manifestly not the case when it comes to using modern apps. So 
when a forward-looking city council, for example, is demanding online contact rather than 
face-to-face service (which is much costlier as a form of service delivery), it is depriving 
certain individuals and whole groups of equal rights and thus violates the most basic 
norms again. As new research from various countries is confirming, absence of relevant 
knowledge and skills in these rapidly developing fields leads very fast to further 
disadvantaging of already disadvantaged individuals and, if we are not careful, whole 
groups.  
Expertly chaired by Dr. Dian Shah from Singapore, the plenary session after lunch 
offered two very interesting and rich papers. Benedict Rogers sought to illustrate the risks 
arising from religious intolerance in various jurisdictions and fora, making particular 
reference to the Rabat Plan of 2012 and the Beirut Declaration of March 2017 as 
evidence of international law engagement and human rights focus. These are notable 
efforts to protect freedom of religion and freedom of speech, and seek to exert moral as 
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well as sort-of-soft legal authority over leaders, to make them realise the enormous 
responsibility they have. However, as the presentation also showed so well, there are 
many continuing risks to freedom of religion and of expression, in many countries, not 
just Burma and Indonesia that were mainly used as illustrations that pluralism seems to be 
in peril everywhere and we are moving backwards. 
In this context questions were raised in the discussion whether it is appropriate to 
oppose the efforts of states to make declarations about a particular religion as state 
religion. This is evidently a subject of much importance in the Global South, where the 
public sphere is often far less secular than it now is in the rest of the world. From the 
perspective of a global secular framework this reservation would thus make sense. But 
from a local, bottom-up perspective it may be questioned whether anything is wrong with 
making a clear-cut commitment to the respective religious identity of a nation’s majority, 
where that exists in terms of religious identity. As this issue is so closely related to identity, 
silencing the voice or claim of religion would appear to be a questionable strategy for 
anyone seeking to win elections. However, making a declaration about a specific religious 
majority status is only half the job done. The immediate next step – and the most 
significant challenge today - needs then to be to ensure that minorities of whatever kinds 
have guaranteed equal rights and a constitutionally protected position, too. Anything less 
is not conducive to a fair system of human rights protection.  
We have recent examples of efforts to do just this that are then being politically 
assaulted as a sign of moving backwards. This happened, for example, a few years ago in 
Bangladesh, where Islam was re-introduced as state religion, with an immediate addition, 
however, that the other religions were equal.
15
 This was done by the current Awami 
League (AL) government of Sheikh Hasina, seeking to ‘prove’ that her ‘secular 
government is not anti-Islamic. Such a strategic measure is of course also another form of 
legal fictionality or symbolism, but the human rights lobby’s expectations that non-
Western countries should make a firm commitment to separation of law and religion is 
manifestly not as simple as it sounds even in the Global North, and it makes no sense in 
many cases in the Global South. Thus, an explicit guarantee of equal treatment for all 
religions, which still raises questions about minorities within groups, is not only an 
alternative method, but probably a better suited one for countries that also retain personal 
law systems and thus account for the presence and inclusive combination of corners 2 and 
1 in their legal systems anyway. This would also be the case, I believe, for Indonesia, 
where the fiction of being a uniform legal system is a nice fiction, similar to the Indian 
fiction that Indian law is a form of common law, which is now finally being challenged 
even by a leading Indian law school.
16
 That whole issue, of course, too, continues to lead 
to massively convoluted debates among various groups of scholars of different convictions 
about the so-called ‘problematic nature’ of personal law systems
17
  
The presentation by Dr. Abu Bakar Eby Hara threw specific light on issues of 
securitisation and terrorism in Indonesia, in the wake of the Bali bombings and 
subsequent developments and debates. It became clear through this presentation, too, 
that the role of identity in relation to religion and law-making is of utmost importance also 
in Indonesia. Hence, it can easily be manipulated by politicians who deliberately forget 
about the wider public interest and pursue their own agenda to profit in all sorts of ways. 
The definition of intolerance came up in the Q&A part, predictably, and it is pertinent 
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that I should point here to a new study on this topic.
18
 This is focused on south Asia, 
mainly Pakistan and Bangladesh, but also includes a chapter on Malaysia. It also has 
much to say to scholars in Indonesia, too, particularly about the relationship between 
religion and society, and so explicitly the relationship of corners 1 and 2 on the kite of 
law. 
Panel Session 4, Chamber 4.2 allowed me to listen to Dr. Anton Widyanto, who had 
made interventions in earlier panels and now focused on the conflicts in Aceh and the 
role of Qanun No. 6/2014 in that part of Indonesia. It is clear that like in Pakistan, the 
boundary of private/public law is being affected by such laws, and thus the key problem 
identified by Benkin in relation to intolerance, namely the self-righteousness of the 
believers who impose their own convictions on others because they believe they are the 
only right truth, is the real problem.
19
 However, in relation to Aceh, as well, not only the 
selfish agenda and ambitions of certain leaders may be implicated. Here, too, the 
pressures of international organisations and human rights activists may very well have led 
to a defensive local counter-reaction, generating reactive self-righteousness in the belief 
that this is the right thing to do to defend one’s own beliefs and convictions. Of course, 
then we are right in the middle of all those debates about different shades and 
interpretations of jihad and its consequences. I think that the debates on all of this will 
benefit tremendously from taking account of what Ahmed (2016) suggests as a viable 
methodology to re-assess our global understandings of what it means to be Islamic. 
Intriguingly, this realisation was completely re-enforced, at least for me, by listening 
to the next speaker, Syamsu Madyan, who intriguingly went as far as speaking of 
hermeneutical gaps in the convoluted debates about whether there are gaps between 
Islam and human rights. Another contribution of this session that was in my view very 
pertinent was the distinction of two kinds of rights (haq), namely God’s right and human 
rights, and the resultant conclusion that therefore human rights must be different from 
Islam. From an internal Islamic perspective, this seems correct, as the statement that 
God’s law is superior to any form of man’s law is axiomatic from that religious 
perspective. However, the more wide-ranging approach, namely that all religions are 
ultimately forms of human constructs as efforts to make sense of something beyond 
human powers, on the one hand, and the realisation that there is no such thing as a 
globally uniform approach to human rights, suggests that Indonesian scholars, because of 
the existence of the basic principle of Pancasila, actually are ideally placed to enlighten the 
world on what it means to be Islamic in a plural context.  
God, not as some old man-like bearded figure, but a higher entity than any human 
force, as in principle 1 of Pancasila, can then perhaps be seen to take any form humans 
care to imagine, or even no form at all, as this formlessness – which does not mean lesser 
power!) is indeed also suggested by Islam’s ban on depicting God in images. So this 
higher force, in various cultural naming traditions that we classify as ‘religions’, is indeed 
higher than any form of human authority. But by dictating to its own believers how to 
envisage or imagine – and revere - God, while not allowing a visual identification, 
‘fundamentalist’ Islam in a reductionist fashion, it could be argued, takes away some of 
the unending complexity of that higher entity’s authority and complete ultimate control. It 
fails to implement the third pillar of Islam, namely that every individual at the end of life 
comes up for judgment. One may sense a self-contradiction here in identifying a 
personification of God in a religion that does not actually allow believers to perceive Him 
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as a person. I think that here, too, the methodology proposed by Ahmed to bring 
together Pre-Text, Text and Context helps us identify the legal vision of Pancasila in 
Indonesia as a highly sophisticated balancing act that is completely Islamic, while still 
allowing freedom of religion - and the discretion of the third pillar of religion - to 
individuals.
20
 This kind of debate about religious philosophy was of course not held in the 
Q&A, but I see the scope, in future discussions, to go into such matters in much more 
analytical depth also in relation to Islamic law topics. The foundations for this kind of 
progress were laid in this really exciting session which, notably, attracted more men than 
women, which is something that ought to be watched, as female voices and inputs in this 
debate are urgently needed, too. 
Alvin Dwi Nanda’s contribution also gave rise to interesting questions at the end, 
which would appear to me to focus on the extent to which humans can actually sit in 
judgment over matters that God is believed to have regulated, but often by the Qur’an 
leaving so many open questions.
21
 Here again, Ahmed and his methodology come into 
perspective, and I look forward to hearing more in future discussions. 
Panel Session 5, Chapter 5.1 saw a presentation by Irfan L. Sahindi about symbolic 
violence in Indonesia. His theoretical efforts to link the debate to Bourdieu’s work on 
indicators of groups seemed to me to lack recognition of the fact that these groups are 
made up of individuals as thinking and reacting beings, and also as believers in particular 
forms of ‘religion’. If around 340 churches have been shut or destroyed in Indonesia 
between 2005-10 and blasphemy-related arguments are increasingly used as justification in 
conflicts, fuelling them rather than toning them down, we are right back in the middle of 
debates about the dangers of self-righteousness of the convinced believers who tolerate no 
other views than their own. It is clear that if Indonesia goes down further that route, it will 
end up where Pakistan is today, in a self-destructive spiral so clearly identified by the 
amazingly complex study of Naarmann,
22
 which unfortunately is written in German, but 
which I have reviewed in English.
23
 It is clear that this important comparative study on the 
risks of operating a blasphemy law needs to be made more widely accessible, so that 
resourceful people like the young speaker can develop their own understanding of the 
very important topic they are studying in future research. 
Farah Dina Herawati in the same panel session almost seamlessly continued the 
discussions about methods of defending Islam. She observed significant changes in her 
environment in Indonesia and linked her debate to the theorising of Habermas. Doing so 
makes sense, but one needs to be aware that the original theories of Habermas about the 
public sphere were completely secular and it is only since after 9/11 that Habermas has 
included ‘religion’ as a factor in his consideration, of course with remarkable 
consequences for his theories, but also for his image among ‘progressive’ thinkers and 
observers. I think that an important lesson for this development for Indonesia may well 
be further studies of what it means to be more specific about what ‘secular’ actually means 
in the Indonesian public sphere. This would also tell us more about to what extent the 
writings and considerations of Habermas are actually pertinent to Asian debates about 
religion and law. 
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Finally, Rizqi Bachtiar sought to measure the feasibility of online petitions in 
Indonesia in relation to public policy. This important issue of responsible governance and 
efforts to manage a more open form of government were presented as further evidence 
that human rights protection may be moving backward, as so little seems to happen in 
reaction to such online activities. This is of course a matter of Indonesian politics and its 
administrative management, but the wider issue would be to what extent government in 
Indonesia is responsive to public interest claims of various kinds. Questions would also 
arise to what extent, if the government does not listen to petitions and representations, 
various form of social action litigation or public interest litigation would be possible in 
Indonesia. These types of action are very prominent in Indian law and now also in South 
Africa, too, and they are not, as many scholars are wrongly claiming, copied from the 
USA, but are an indigenously rooted form of action, which is also supported - and in fact 
anticipated - by the Indian Constitution and its cleverly worded Article 32, which also 
guarantees the right to access to the protective mechanisms for protecting human rights. 
notably, it does this by using the term ‘by appropriate proceedings’, which as we know, 
may be a postcard from jail on the part of someone who is illegally incarcerated, or any 
bona fide petition by any concerned individual, provided there is evidence of an actual 
infringement of a basic fundamental right. The young presenter, who was right to defend 
his position by saying that he only talked about public policy in this paper, should 
nevertheless be encouraged to think further than his present project, and deserves 
congratulations for daring to raise this potentially highly conflictual topic. But then, the 
fact that one can raise such debates in post-authoritarian Indonesia is itself a sign that not 
everything is moving backward, and that discussions such as these ones held in this 
conference are not only necessary, but will be fruitful and constructive. This will be more 
so, if we all learn to be a little more aware of the fact that so many different competing 
voices and claims co-exist and vie for our attention, and we constantly have to make 
choices in our assessment of any one issue for debate. 
Thus for me, the Conference confirmed the basic principle of the kite theory that in 
all these potentially conflictual debates, even though it may not look like this, some 
progress is being made, and we are not actually moving backward, quite apart from the 
fact that time is relentlessly ticking on. But the pressures to make decisions, and thus to 
arrange and critically consider, basically in a two-level process, the respective sequences of 
the ever-present four kite corner elements, with their respective sub-corners, are a taxing 
demand on all of us. Making a decision about our own positionality simply identifies what 
corner of the global kite of law is our respective starting point. In that sense, as I 
explained in the final lecture, a responsible judge will be aware that s/he has to start from 
corner 3 and operates the decision-making trajectory as part of a state-dominated 
framework of legal reference, so to say.  
That is easy, compared to what comes next. Having selected one’s starting point, now 
the decisions have to be made about how, within that particular corner of the global kite, 
the respective sub-kite is to be balanced out. In this process, none of the four corners 
involved may be completely ignored or discarded, as this would be epistemic and actual 
violence. This predicament forces lawyers to constantly remember that law is more than 
just state law, or just human rights law or international regulation, and it is also more than 
just religious law, or just adat normativity in any specific local Indonesian manifestation. 
Where is, in any one specific scenario, the right balance? And, aware that this right 
balance might be only a temporary arrangement, how does one sure, if that is even 
possible, that a particular legal position or strategy becomes secure, solidifies into 
something sustainable in the long term and becomes and remains a ‘good law’? Contrary 
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to what one of the most recent books in this field, Croce seems to still suggest, ‘the right 
law’ and finding an appropriate legal order is not just a matter of state-centric 
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